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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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This paper focuses on ways to reduce testing effort and costs associated with 
technology-advancement upgrades to systems with open architectures. This situation is 
common in Navy and DoD contexts such as submarine, aircraft carrier, and airframe 
systems, and accounts for a substantial fraction of the testing effort. This paper describes 
methods for determining when testing of unmodified components can be reduced or 
avoided, and it outlines some methods for choosing test cases efficiently to focus retesting 
where it is needed, given information about past testing of the same component. Changes to 
the environment of a system can affect its reliability, even if the behavior of the system 
remains unchanged. The new capabilities added by a technology upgrade can interact with 
previously existing capabilities, changing the frequency of their usage as well as the range 
of input values and, hence, changing their effect on overall system reliability. 
Keywords: open architecture, reducing regression testing, automated testing, 
statistical testing, dependency analysis, reuse, technology upgrades. 
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Current US Navy combat and weapon system test procedures require an integration 
test event with every change to the software or system configuration to certify that the 
software-intensive system-of-systems is stable and functional. As more systems are moving 
to a modular open architecture, software configurations are changing with increased 
frequency, requiring more testing, which is expensive and time-consuming.   
The Navy’s open architecture framework is intended to promote reuse and reduce 
costs. Ongoing research at the Naval Postgraduate School is developing improvements to 
the test and evaluation procedures that can contribute to these goals. Test and evaluation 
accounts for a large part of system-development cost, but the impact of open architecture 
ideas on this part of the process has been relatively modest so far. The purpose of this effort 
is to provide sound engineering approaches to better realize the potential benefits of Navy 
open architectures and to provide concrete means that support economical acquisition and 
effective sustainment of such systems. 
The specific goals of this research are to enable: (1) identification of specific testing 
and checking procedures that do not need to be repeated after given changes to a system, 
(2) limiting the scope and reducing the cost of retesting when the latter is necessary, and (3) 
a single analysis to provide assurance that all possible configurations that can be generated 
in a model-driven architecture will satisfy given dependability requirements. This paper 
reports some results that address the first two of the goals listed above. A roadmap and 
technical approach for reaching the third goal are outlined in Berzins, Rodriquez, and 
Wessman (2007). 
Technology upgrades are typically performed on a two-year cycle. They often involve 
migration to the best hardware and operating system version available at the time, where 
“best” implies a balanced trade-off between high performance and reliable operation. 
Typically, only a small fraction of the application code has been changed. However, current 
certification practices require all of the code to be retested prior to deployment, whether it 
has been modified or not. Retesting of an unchanged module can be avoided only if we can 
establish that it has not been adversely impacted by the change. Preliminary results on how 
to do that have been reported by Berzins (2008). In this paper, we further explore ways to 
determine whether it is safe not to retest an unchanged component under the assumption 
that the load characteristics of the component have not changed. We also address the 
problem of how to most effectively focus retesting for unchanged components in cases 
where the requirements and behavior of the component have not changed but the load 
characteristics have changed. 
The latter situation has great importance for assuring reliability of reusable 
components. Many past cases of well-publicized software failures involved reuse of software 
components in new environments that had different characteristics than the contexts for 
which the components were originally designed. These components failed in their new 
environments despite the fact that they were well-tested and found to be reliable in the field 
under previous deployment conditions. Examples include the Patriot missile failure 
(Marshall, 1992) and the failure of the European Ariane 5 rocket (Jézéquel & Meyer, 1997, 
January). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes methods for 
deciding when re-testing of unchanged components can be safely reduced or eliminated 
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entirely; Section 3 presents methods for efficiently retesting reusable components for use in 
deployment environments with workloads that are different from previous deployments; 
Section 4 identifies some relevant previous work; and Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
Deciding When Retesting Can Be Avoided 
Our previous work identified two types of analysis that could enable safe avoidance 
of retesting unchanged components under certain conditions: program slicing and 
invariance testing (Berzins, 2008). These techniques are applicable in cases in which the 
requirements, code, expected workload and available resources of the component are 
unchanged. This section briefly reviews the approach and then examines in more detail 
what additional analysis needs to be done to safely reuse such components in the next 
release without retesting them. 
Program slicing is a kind of dependency analysis that is based on the source code. 
Slicing algorithms are efficient enough to be used on practical, large-scale programs. If two 
different versions of a program have the same slice with respect to a service it provides, 
then that service has the same functional behavior in both versions, and retesting can be 
avoided if having the same functional behavior is sufficient to establish the reliability of the 
component (Gallagher, 1991, August).  
Invariance testing is a kind of statistical, automated testing that is applicable to 
components whose code has changed but whose specifications and requirements remain 
the same. The purpose of an invariance test is to confirm that the changes to the code have 
not changed the behavior of the services it provides. In this kind of a situation, it is easy to 
implement a test oracle procedure (explained below) that enables affordable checking of 
large numbers of automatically executed test cases. Invariance testing can increase the 
number of components that can be certified not to need retesting when combined with 
program slicing (Berzins, 2008). Invariance testing can also be used to educe the cost of 
retesting modules that need to be retested, even though their requirements remain 
unchanged. This includes unchanged components that depend on other modified 
components, which are identified by program slicing methods, as well as unchanged 
components whose expected workload has changed (see section 3). 
We can omit retesting of a service if slicing and invariance testing confirm that its 
behavior is unchanged in the new release and that the following additional conditions are 
met: 
1. The same functional behavior is appropriate in the new release, which occurs only if 
the requirements of the component are unchanged. 
2. The same functional behavior is sufficient to meet the requirements only if the 
requirements do not contain timing constraints. If this is not the case, the timing 
constraints need to be retested because changes to hardware, systems software, 
and other components in the system can all affect timing. This can be done by using 
a kind of invariance testing that measures timing and by the methods described by 
Qiao, Wang, Luqi, and Berzins (2006, March). 
3. Constraints due to shared resources need to be rechecked, which can usually be 
done via system-level stress testing. Such constraints include: 
a. Sufficient main memory and disk space 
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b. Sufficient I/O resources such as number of files that need to be open at the same 
time, printers, sensors, actuators, or other peripherals. 
c. Sufficient network bandwidth to support worst-case communications load. 
d. Effective access to showed databases and web services, including both timing 
and freedom from deadlocks. 
4. The slicing analysis is only valid under the assumption that the machine code that is 
actually running corresponds to the source code that was subjected to slicing 
analysis. 
5. The analysis depends on the assumption that the computer correctly translates the 
source code into machine language. 
The fourth assumption is frequently made without explicit acknowledgement in 
theoretical studies, but it cannot be adopted without verification in serious risk analysis 
because of the following plausible failure modes: 
1. Memory-corrupting bugs—these include out-of-bounds write operations on arrays 
and through invalid pointers. Such bugs can cause seemingly innocuous statements 
to overwrite parts of the program itself at runtime, with unpredictable and potentially 
catastrophic results. 
2. Deliberate cyber-attacks—compromise of system security via network or 
unauthorized insider access to systems can deliberately modify machine code at run-
time. 
Memory-corrupting bugs are faults in the code that should be detected by test and 
evaluation processes, and some types can be prevented. One class of memory-corrupting 
bugs is caused by premature deallocation of dynamically created objects. Garbage-
collection algorithms are supposed to prevent this class of problems so that garbage-
collected languages such as Java and Lisp should be immune to this type of problem. 
Software written in languages without garbage collection, such as C, C++ and Ada, needs 
special quality-assurance methods to look for premature deallocation. There exist a variety 
of tools that can be used for this task, including Valgrind (2009, April) (see the system 
commands Memcheck and Ptrcheck) and Insure ++ (2009, April).  
We note that in the absence of perfect computer security, which is not likely to be 
attainable in the near future, no amount of test and evaluation can detect or prevent failures 
of the second kind because they are not present in the system while it is being tested; they 
only appear later—after attacks at run-time. We, therefore, recommend adding a design 
modification that checks at run-time whether component code is still the same as it was in 
the test load for all mission-critical systems that do not already have such a capability. 
This can be done by packaging the machine code in blocks with secure digital 
signatures and adding a process that periodically checks the signatures while the system is 
running. To make this secure, the digital signatures have to be cryptographic checksums 
with strong encryption so that attackers cannot modify a code module and then forge a 
signature without knowledge of the secret key. The periodic checking process systematically 
scans the code modules and checks their digital signatures. If it discovers a modified 
module, it can repair that module and also report the problem to appropriate authorities. 
Repair can be accomplished by reloading the module from an uncorruptable source such as 
read-only memory or CD. Failure due to possible physical damage to media can be 
mitigated by redundant copies. The repair process checks the digital signature of the new 
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copy to verify its integrity and goes to alternative backup copies if there are any 
discrepancies. We note that this mechanism can be used to compensate for faults due to 
memory corruption regardless of whether they were caused by attacks or by faults in the 
code. The state of corrupted modules will usually have to be restored to the most recent, 
valid date after the corrupted code is repaired. Component designs may have to be 
augmented to provide this service. There is extensive literature on how to perform rollbacks, 
particularly in the context of database transitions. A discussion of this problem for object-
oriented components can be found in Vandewoude and Berbers (2005). 
The mechanism proposed above is similar to a scheme used by a telephone 
company to keep its software operational, despite the presence of memory-corrupting bugs, 
which were known to exist but whose source could not be located. This technology has 
been proven effective in practice and has been used for decades. 
The mechanism can also repair faults due to corruption of data if the scanning 
process understands the data structures and has code to check the invariant constraints 
associated with them. This can be incorporated into the architecture via a standard interface 
that every data type must implement for a service that checks all associated data constraints 
and repairs them if needed. 
Technology upgrades typically move to new hardware, which implies the use of new 
compilers and new versions of the operating system. Presumably, these underlying services 
are reliable, but, if we are to retest only a subset of the components in the new release, 
these assumptions need to be verified. This can be done using invariance testing, as 
explained by Berzins (2008). The correct operation of the new version of the compiler can 
be checked by combining invariance testing with the approach to testing translators 
described in Berzins, Auguston, and Luqi (2001, December). 
Retesting Unchanged Components under New Load Conditions 
The previous section discusses situations in which the following conditions hold: 
1. The code of the component is unchanged. 
2. The requirements and specifications of the component are unchanged.  
3. The expected workload of the component is unchanged. 
This section examines what should be done if the first two conditions are met, but the 
third one is not: the code and requirements of a component are unchanged, but the 
expected workload is different. This situation is expected when a component is reused in a 
different context. Such situations will be common when one of the stated objectives of open 
architectures is achieved: extensive reuse of common components across platforms. 
In these cases, some retesting is necessary. We would like to do this efficiently by 
reusing previous test results and focusing additional testing effort on the system behavior 
that will be exercised more in the new workload than it was in the previous ones. We, 
therefore, seek a systematic method to generate new test cases that characterize situations 
expected in the new deployment context that were not expected in the previous deployment 
contexts. This informal idea can be made precise in the context of automated statistical 
testing (Berzins, 2008). 
Automated statistical testing is characterized by the following properties: 
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1. Test cases are automatically generated by random sampling from an operational 
profile. An operational profile is a probability distribution that represents the relative 
frequency of different input values to the system under test in its expected execution 
environment. 
2. Pass/fail decisions for individual test cases are automated and done by a single test 
oracle procedure that applies to all possible inputs to the service or system under 
test. 
3. If the generated set of test cases runs without detecting any failures, a simple 
formula gives a lower bound on the mean number of executions with a 
corresponding statistical confidence level. 
The significance of the first two conditions is economic: after the fixed initial cost of 
implementing the operational profile and the test oracle, the marginal cost of running an 
additional test case is very small. This is because there is no additional human effort 
associated with additional test cases; only additional computer resources are needed to run 
more test cases, and computer time costs much less than human effort. 
The consequence is that very large numbers of test cases can be run economically, 
making it affordable to collect sample sets large enough to provide high statistical 
confidence levels in the results. Methods for determining the sample size needed to support 
conclusions of the form “the mean number of executions between failures is at least N with 
confidence (1- (1/N)” can be found in Berzins (2008). The significance of this is that it can 
enable practical testing to specified risk-tolerance levels, rather than testing until budget 
runs out. The latter does not provide high confidence in system reliability, although it occurs 
commonly in current practices. 
Figure 1 shows an example of the situation described above. The distribution g1 
represents the operational profile for the initial deployment of a hypothetical reusable 
component and g2 represents the operational profile characterizing a new environment in 
which the component is to be reused. Note that a wider range of input values is expected in 
the new environment. In this example, g1 and g2 are normal distributions; g1 has a standard 
deviation of 1.0, and g2 has a standard deviation of 2.0. 
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Figure 1. Operational Profiles for Two Different Deployment Environments 
 
Figure 2. The Derived Testing Profile 
Figure 2 shows the profile difference for incremental testing that is derived from the 
distributions in Figure 1 and the resulting testing profile under the assumption that the 
number of test cases needed to reach the reliability goals associated with both the previous 
and the new execution environment are the same. 
The profile difference is zero in the region where g1 > g2, and it is equal to the 
difference g2 – g1 everywhere else. The rationale for these choices is the following: 
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The region where g1 > g2 has already been adequately tested since the expected 
number of samples from this region that were checked during prior testing using the profile 
g1 exceed the expected number of samples from the same region that would be required in 
testing under the execution profile g2, characterizing the new deployment environment. 
Therefore, we can avoid this region in the second round of testing, which is accomplished by 
setting the testing profile to zero in this region.  
The remaining region needs more test cases for adequate coverage. If we consider 
an arbitrary slice of this region, we find that the area under g1 in this slice represents the 
expected number of test cases that were run in the previous round of testing governed by 
the profile g1. The area under g2 in the same slice represents the expected number of test 
cases from the slice that need to be run in the second round of testing. The total area under 
the profile difference represents the number of test cases needed for the second round of 
testing as a fraction of the number of test cases required in the first round of testing. In the 
example, this fraction is calculated to be .552. The testing profile is proportional to the profile 
difference, which must be normalized by dividing it by the probability mass under the curve 
to make all of the probabilities add up to 1. 
The more general case—in which the reliability goals in the two execution 
environments differ—has a similar rationale, but the two distributions have to be scaled to 
account for the differences in the number of test cases needed in each test. 
Let N1 be the number of test cases that were needed from profile p1 for the first 
deployment environment and N2 be the number of cases from a different profile p2, needed 
for the second environment. Then, in the general case, the profile difference is zero where 
N1*p1 > N2*p2 and is equal to (N2*p2 – p1* N1)/(N1 +N2) elsewhere.  
The testing profile is again the normalized profile difference, obtained by dividing it 
by the area under the profile difference curve.    
We are currently investigating effective methods for modeling operational profiles 
and for deriving model parameters from historical measurements of actual system loads. 
Such measurements can come from instrumenting systems to collect data during training 
exercises or actual missions. 
The inputs to the software module must be analyzed to determine dependencies 
among them. It is also necessary to look for dependencies between the interfaces and other 
external environmental factors within the context of the operational profile and testing goals. 
If dependencies exist, they should be characterized.  
Once the inputs and the relationship(s) among them are known, the next step is to 
estimate or specify the distributions that characterize the probabilistic behavior of the inputs. 
If there are dependencies, the notion of conditional distributions will be considered as a way 
to handle them. There also may be multiple possible distributions for each input, depending 
on the state of the environment. This also applies if the goals can vary from testing the 
normal range of inputs to testing extreme cases, which may be necessary for checking 




==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=~Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=íê~åëáíáçå======== - 197 - 
=
=
A histogram can be used to represent the new data resulting from the measurements 
to provide a visual check of the observations. However, it is advisable to fit a distribution 
based on a theoretical model of the expected distributions for the following reasons: 
1. Smoothing—the histogram will show irregularities due to granularity of the random 
sampling in the measurements. These are not physically significant and are most 
effectively mitigated by finding the best fit to a smooth curve that interpolates 
between the samples and smoothes out the gaps. 
2. Extrapolation—realistic probability distributions do not cut off suddenly but rather 
gradually decrease with long tails. Such tails are impossible to accurately estimate 
based solely on measured data because the number of observed samples is often 
too small to provide an accurate measurement near the extremes of the expected 
range of values. If we use the histogram as measured, it is likely that we will set the 
probability distribution to zero in places where it is actually small, but nonzero. Since 
this will result in tests that do not cover the full range of possible parameter values, 
we propose to use a theoretical model in this region and to do the extrapolation by 
matching the standard deviation of the actual measurements to the standard 
deviation of the theoretical model. This will smoothly extrapolate the tails out to or 
beyond the real limits of the input value range. Details about how to choose an 
appropriate theoretical model for this purpose are still under investigation. 
We are also planning to investigate the effectiveness of Bayesian methods for 
estimating the distributions based on the actual data. This approach will also need a 
theoretical model of the probability distribution function, which will be used as the prior 
distribution. 
 
Figure 3. A Stress-testing Profile, s(x), Compared to an Operational Profile, g(x) 
The methods outlined above should provide a systematic way to deal with the 
“known unknowns.” However, military environments are characterized by uncertainty and 
surprises. To hedge against the possibility of “unknown unknowns,” we recommend running 
additional tests on components to be reused in new environments with a “stress-testing 
profile” that purposely exaggerates the range of expected input values. This kind of stress 
testing is difficult to put on a scientific basis because we are trying to hedge against 
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possibilities that we have no basis for predicting. The following heuristics are proposed as 
strategies to try: 
1. Use a uniform distribution that extends from three to one hundred standard 
deviations in all directions from the measured mean of the distribution. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The curve g shown in blue represents the normal profile, which 
is the same as the curve g1 shown in Figure 1, and the curve s represents the 
stress-testing profile. The curve s has been scaled up by a factor of 10 to make it 
easier to see in the figure. 
2. Use a uniform distribution that covers the entire valid range of input values. This will 
include completely unexpected input values. 
Recalling that these strategies are intended to be used in the context of completely 
automated statistical testing, in which the marginal cost of running and analyzing additional 
test cases is very low, we recommend a mixed strategy that runs tests from all three of the 
proposed testing profiles, each with a number of samples derived from the risk-tolerance 
parameter k, specified by system stakeholders and the measured execution frequency 
parameters es according to the relation Ts = (kes)log2(kes), as explained in Berzins (2008). 
Ts represents the number of the test cases that are needed for testing services to the 
statistical confidence level implied by the specified risk-tolerance parameter. 
Relevant Previous Work 
Methods for detecting memory corrupting bugs via static and dynamic program 
analysis have been studied (Alzamil, 2006; 2008, November). Program slicing (Weiser, 
1984, July) has been used in a wide variety of applications, including testing (Binkley, 1998; 
Gupta, Harrold & Soffa, 1992; Harman & Danicic, 1995; Hierons, Harman & Danicic, 1999; 
Hierons, Harman, Fox, Ouarbya & Daoudi, 2002), debugging (Agrawal, DeMillo & Spafford, 
1993; Lyle & Weiser, 1987), program understanding (De Lucia, Fasolino & Munro, 1996; 
Harman, Hierons, Danicic, Howroyd & Fox, 2001), reverse engineering (Canfora, Cimitile & 
Munro, 1994), software maintenance (Gallagher, 1991, August; Cimitile, De Lucia & Munro, 
1996; 1994), change merging (Horwitz, Prins & Reps, 1989; Berzins & Dampier, 1996), and 
software metrics (Lakhotia, 1993; Bieman & Ott, 1994). More detailed surveys of previous 
work on slicing can be found in Binkley and Harmon (2004).  
The problem of state transfers for modules upgraded at run-time is addressed by 
Vandewoude and Berbers (2005). A method for assessing the impact of timing constraints 
on proposed system upgrades is described in Qiao, Wang, Luqi, and Berzins (2006, March). 
Conclusion 
Program slicing and invariance testing are methods that can be used to identify 
cases in which it is safe not to retest an unchanged component. These methods need to be 
augmented with other means for establishing the absence of other possible failure modes 
such as the possibility of memory-corrupting bugs and timing faults. This paper identifies 
ways to solve these issues. 
When components are reused in environments with substantially different load 
characteristics than previous deployment environments, it is important to test the 
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components under the new modes of operation. This paper presents systematic and 
efficient ways to accomplish that. 
Further work is needed to explore ways to address other possible failure models, 
including possible interference due to shared system resources, and to address the longer-
term goal of eventually eliminating the need for repeating integration testing after every 
system change. Specifically, more work is needed on methods for certifying the reliability of 
architectures independently from the components that they contain and for certifying the 
conformance of an implementation to a given architecture in order to attain the long-term 
goals outlined in the introduction. 
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